An armed Russian drone shakes Latvia's defense system – Analysis – Eurasia Review

By Maris Andžāns

(FPRI) – On the morning of September 7, an armed Russian kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) landed in the Gaigalava municipality in eastern Latvia. The UAV was a Shahed 136 drone of Iranian origin, which Russia frequently uses in its war in Ukraine. These UAVs are slow and loud, earning them the nickname “flying moped.” However, because these drones are cheap and have a simple design, Russia, which calls them Geran-2, can afford to produce and deploy them in large quantities.

The intrusion of Russian drones and missiles into NATO territory is no longer an exceptional event. A day after the incident in Latvia, Romania reported that a Russian drone had entered its airspace. Previously, there were further incidents involving flying objects of Russian origin not only in Romania, but also in Poland. In March 2022, an old Soviet-era drone crashed all the way to Croatia.

Latvia borders Russia and Belarus, but not Ukraine. Therefore, the landing of the Russian drone in Latvia came as a surprise to both the public and allegedly the Latvian armed forces. Air defense, normally a complex and expensive undertaking, is far from ideal in Latvia. The country currently has no combat aircraft and no long- or medium-range air defense systems. (It is working with Estonia on the procurement of the IRIS-T medium-range system.) To be fair, NATO countries with more sophisticated defenses have experienced similar incidents, which only underscores the difficulties in identifying and shooting down such UAVs.

The Russian drone incursion became one of the most significant military incidents in recent Latvian history. It is also arguably the most damaging to the reputation of the Latvian Armed Forces, which is normally highly trusted by the public. Although it was only a single drone and there were no injuries, the incident sparked strong criticism of the armed forces' (in)action and the way the defense sector communicates with the public.

Initially, the Latvian public was informed about the incident a full day after the incident and in rather vague terms. Even the head of the respective community only found out about the incident the next day – from the media, not from the defense sector. (Some surrounding households were alerted to the detonation of the drone explosives, although the blast could be heard and felt up to two miles away.) It took another day before a news conference was called, with key questions left unanswered. It remained unclear what the Latvian armed forces did or did not do other than monitoring the drone in the air. The Russian drone allegedly entered Latvian airspace from Belarus and managed to fly about 100 km from the border. Many wondered why the drone wasn't shot down and what would have happened if the UAV had crashed in a city. The exact route of the drone has not been published, but according to the map, Rēzekne, the second largest city in Latgale, may have been close to or even on the drone's route.

Latvian institutions have since launched an investigation into the incident and called on NATO allies to improve Latvia's air defenses and defenses on its eastern border. Russia – predictably but implausibly – denied responsibility. While Latvian institutions assume that Latvia was not the target of this drone, it should not be completely ruled out that this was a deliberate attempt by Russia to test and test the Latvian defense system.

The UAV landing will likely serve as an opportunity to strengthen Latvia's defense capabilities. The incident was a stark reminder that despite investments in Latvia's defense (in particular, Latvia is estimated to spend 3.15% of its gross domestic product on defense this year), there is still significant room for improvement. Until recently, Latvia viewed its eastern border predominantly as a land border. Therefore, it focuses on building a fence on the border with Russia and Belarus (also in response to the weaponization of migration) and is working on the construction of the Baltic defense line, consisting of anti-tank ditches, dragon's teeth and other obstacles.

More attention is already being paid to detecting and defending against aerial threats in border regions. Additional military units were deployed to detect and defend against similar threats. Following indications of a similar incident on September 17, NATO fighter jets were dispatched from Lielvārde Air Base to identify a flying object approaching from Belarus. Although the object turned out to be a flock of birds, this case suggests progress in responding to possible intruders.

The drone incident is already serving as a lesson in how to (not) communicate with the public in such cases. The defense sector admitted to learning lessons from this incident. In future cases, municipalities will be informed immediately about the situation and included in communication with local citizens. However, this incident offers broader lessons for crisis communications. It became clear that the public would like to have access to more information in future cases. Further steps should be taken to establish more active, comprehensive and inclusive communication on defense and security issues wherever possible. The relevant institutions should also be ready to admit mistakes when they are made and their influence on such incidents is beyond their control.

• About the author: from the Center for Geopolitical Studies Riga and Associate Professor at Riga Stradiņš University
• Source: This article was published by FPRI