The fight between Israel and Hezbollah offers an opportunity to restore balance to the region

In the previous issue on September 25, this column discussed the impact of Israeli attacks on Hezbollah on the stability of Lebanon as a whole. In other words, the column outlined the possibility of another Lebanese civil war as a result of the flooding of Shiite refugees into other parts of the city that didn't want them – particularly Druze and Maronite Christian areas. The column's main argument, however, focused on a positive outcome: a major upheaval that could free Lebanon from Hezbollah and Iran's domination, which many Lebanese (including many Lebanese Shiites) would tacitly welcome. At the time of writing, Nasrallah was still alive.

Some parts of this column also discussed the broader regional implications of a Hezbollah collapse in the present, with a brief foray into the history of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). The fact is that the US and the West have accepted ultimate control of Lebanon from anti-Western rivals Syria/Iran in exchange for stability in the Middle East, a strategic, oil-producing region. But times have changed. In terms of energy, the USA has become practically self-sufficient. There is no urgent need for Middle Eastern oil. Therefore, no urgent motivation to accept stability in undesirable configurations. The other side of this coin is that the US has no particular reason to force peace or interfere too much directly. And this creates a vacuum in the long term. At first glance, it seems that no one has the power or incentive to coordinate a holistic peace – not the US, not Moscow, not Tehran, not the Chinese.

However, for the West, despite its reluctance, the opportunity may be too good to miss at some point. However, as already mentioned in the previous column, this moment offers Israel, for now, the rare chance to undertake a quiet diplomatic offensive in addition to the military one, so that conditions in Lebanon do not return to the status quo, where another war with Hezbollah broke out in 15 will erupt in a year or so (the last one was in 2006). There are many voices, not least in Israel itself, who argue that Netanyahu has no interest in creating peace out of chaos because conflict keeps him in power. Maybe so, but conditions have never been more favorable and it may be his only chance to salvage his reputation among the Israeli population after such a long war. And after the massive intelligence failure on October 7th that led to so much bloodshed.

Why are the conditions uniquely favorable? Let's list. Historically speaking, all opposing forces are missing. The Soviet Union is gone. Russia is too distracted in Ukraine to play a spoiler role. Saddam is gone. Gaddafi is gone. Syria is fragmented and Assad's government is barely able to act. Iran continues to reject the invitation to all-out war, especially because it knows that any external pressure could reignite the domestic insurgency and topple the regime. In fact, actively anti-Israel regional powers are weaker than ever. Furthermore, the circle of Sunni states would welcome any chance to disrupt Iran's hegemony.

We are talking about Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the like. That is why diplomacy must be conducted extremely quietly. In the current climate, no such leader, after all his criticism of Gaza, can openly participate in making peace with Israel. This is why the Abraham Accords are in ruins – a plunder that Iran and Hamas deliberately sought by October 7th. They and Russia were very upset that the accords were left out of shaping the future of the region and found a way to change things around. But the Middle East is a very stubborn place. All of the above-mentioned leaders of Sunni countries, despite their public outrage over Gaza, will seize the opportunity to create a new regional order without Iranian domination – and participate in restoring Sunni primacy over Shiites. The current popularity and place in the history of Islam should be sufficient incentive for everyone to emerge as peacemakers and unifiers of believers.

So what is needed now is an expanded, reconfigured version of the agreements in which more Sunni countries capable of doing so, such as those mentioned above, have a stake in the stability of Gaza and Lebanon. American participation is unlikely to play a role until after the US elections. Certainly, at least until then, if at all, Israel cannot count on US help in a direct war with Iran. And for the reasons mentioned above, Iran is unlikely to engage in such a confrontation, but also because its main ally Russia will prevent a diversion from focusing on Ukraine. (Moscow cannot afford for Iran to shift its military resources – retired drones – en masse elsewhere.) So the proxy wars will continue. Unfortunately, in the next few months we are likely to see Hezbollah and Lebanon suffer increased Israeli punishment, likely in the form of a widespread invasion and incessant bombing. Syria and even parts of Yemen will feel the wrath of the Israeli war machine. Meanwhile, Netanyahu will have a historic chance to readjust the balance of power in the region and permanently protect Israel while pursuing a diplomatic initiative.