Even with the killing of Nasrallah, Hezbollah was far from defeated

Within weeks, Israel decimated the top echelons of Lebanese Hezbollah's command structure, including killing its leader, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. The longtime head of one of the world's most comprehensive terrorist organizations died after the Israeli Air Force dropped dozens of 2,000-pound “bunker buster” bombs on Hezbollah's headquarters in Beirut. There is little doubt that Hezbollah will now face a major challenge as it attempts to restore its ranks.

And while many in Israel and the United States rejoice, the stark reality is that Hezbollah will eventually emerge from this latest round of fighting greatly weakened but capable of rebuilding. After all, Hezbollah is the crown jewel in Iran's so-called resistance axis, and just as after the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, Tehran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will provide sufficient resources and training to ensure the survival of the Hezbollah.

Nasrallah's likely successor is Hashem Safieddine, chairman of Hezbollah's Executive Council and a member of its Jihad Council, who is also a key decision-maker regarding the group's military operations. Safieddine's son is married to the daughter of the late Qasem Soleimani, head of the IRGC's Quds Force, further cementing the connection with Iran. Also instrumental in reviving the group is Naim Qassem, its deputy secretary general, who is deeply loyal to Iran.

Tactical success vs. winning strategy

There is a lively debate in counterterrorism circles about the effectiveness of beheading attacks, which are targeted assassinations that eliminate top leaders of terrorist and insurgent organizations. The scholarly consensus is that decapitation strikes are too often viewed as a panacea, but this confuses tactical success with successful strategy. Removing smart and charismatic militant chiefs is a necessary but not sufficient counterterrorism measure. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in October 2019, almost five years ago, and the Islamic State (ISIS) has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt and evolve despite its weakening.

Hezbollah's predecessor, Islamic Jihad, first emerged more than four decades ago after the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982, which lasted 18 years before the Israelis unilaterally withdrew in 2000. Once described as a ragtag militia, Hezbollah now functions more like a state within a state, boasting 30,000 fully trained armed men and an arsenal of 150,000 rockets, drones and precision-guided missiles. And with dozens of its members sitting in the Lebanese parliament, Hezbollah is inextricably linked to the Lebanese state.

Hezbollah is even more enduring than terrorist groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda because it is an integral part of Lebanon's socio-political fabric. Hezbollah operates a vast network of social services across Lebanon and even has its own development foundation, Jihad al-Bina, which focuses on building infrastructure, educational programs for Lebanese youth and supporting refugees. After every conflagration with Israel, Hezbollah helps repair the damaged and destroyed homes of Lebanese Shiites, strengthening their legitimacy and winning hearts and minds.

With the loss of Nasrallah and other senior leaders, including organizational strategist Fuad Shukr (killed in July), Southern Front commander Ali Karari and the head of the group's elite special forces Radwan, Ibrahim Akil, Hezbollah has now suffered major setbacks. But the group has endured the loss of senior commanders before, including its former leader Abbas al-Musawi, who was killed by Israel in 1992, and its most notorious operational commander, Imad Mugniyeh, who was blown up by a car bomb in Damascus in 2008, the result a joint CIA-Mossad operation.

Ground Invasion: A Gift to Hezbollah

There are a number of other factors that will contribute to Hezbollah's longevity in both the short and long term. In the near future, Hezbollah will seek to use its sophisticated propaganda apparatus, which includes its own Al-Manar television station, to capitalize on growing anti-Israel outrage across the Arab and Islamic world. Beginning with the pager and walkie-talkie attacks last week and the victims of last weekend's bombings, scores of civilians have been killed and hundreds injured, including women and children.

Furthermore, it appears that Israel is far from finished with its military campaign and may be preparing for a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. This would be a gift for Hezbollah, which would fight on home soil and use the invasion as an opportunity to wage a protracted guerrilla war against the Israeli military, relying on classic insurgent tactics that give the group an asymmetrical advantage. After the July 2006 war, Hezbollah emerged from the crisis battered but was buoyed by widespread support from the Sunni Arab street, which was admired for its resistance to Israel.

In the long term, Hezbollah will persist because of the country in which it operates. By most measures, Lebanon remains a failed state, with a government either unable or unwilling to provide for its citizens, a military that does not have a monopoly on the use of force, and glaring gaps in capacity and functionality that leave Hezbollah operational have created scope to fill the gap and intervene where the state is missing. Always eager to train the next generation of fighters, Hezbollah runs a summer camp for children and has even developed first-person shooter video games to further indoctrinate Lebanon's youth.

The next few months will be crucial. Hezbollah needs to figure out how Israel managed to penetrate its organization so thoroughly. Its internal security unit has already begun a mole hunt, searching for Hezbollah members who may provide human intelligence to Israel. Beyond human resources, Israel also boasts an impressive intelligence capability through spy satellites, drones and world-class hacking capabilities, led by its vaunted Unit 8200, known for its cutting-edge cyber capabilities.

Perhaps more than anything else, Hezbollah will endure because its raison d'être – the reason for its existence – is resistance to the State of Israel. Unlike Palestinian terrorist groups that claim to be fighting for an independent Palestinian state, Hezbollah defines itself as a resistance movement against the Jewish state, making future conflict almost inevitable.

What Israel does next will help shape Hezbollah's future and, depending on how events unfold between now and the end of the year, could fuel the group's resurgence at a later date. The Israeli military colloquially refers to its frequent clashes with Hamas as “mowing the grass” – a problem to be managed, not solved. The same goes for Hezbollah, which will also grow despite Israel's current scorched earth offensive and may ultimately emerge even stronger than before.