25 years after the crash

Twenty-five years ago, two passenger trains collided at Ladbroke Grove, two miles west of London's Paddington station.

It was one of the worst rail accidents of the last century, in which 31 people died and 417 were injured.

One of the trains had passed a compromised signal.

It was a turning point for railway safety, and the consequences are still felt today.

At 08:06 BST on 5 October 1999, a Thames Trains train bound for Bedwyn in Wiltshire collided with a Great Western high-speed train from Cheltenham to London.

The combined speed of impact was 130 miles per hour (209 km/h).

The lead car of the diesel multiple unit was largely destroyed. The fuel that was carried ignited and led to fires in both trains.

Most of the deceased were on the Bedwyn train.

Among the dead were Thames Trains engineer Michael Hodder, 31, and Great Western engineer Brian Cooper, 52.

Driver Hodder, who was from Reading, overtook a red signal, SN109, on a bridge portal.

He was inexperienced, having only qualified two weeks before the crash.

The subsequent investigation found deficiencies in his training, including that he was not informed of recent incidents at the same signal.

The SN109 signal has been passed at risk eight times in six years.

The crash occurred on a clear autumn morning and the sun was low in the sky behind Hodder, meaning sunlight would have reflected off the signal, reducing visibility.

Several years after the accident, Thames Trains was fined £2 million after admitting breaches of health and safety regulations. Network Rail, the successor organization to infrastructure owner Railtrack, was eventually fined £4 million in 2007.

A small memorial garden overlooks the site and vigils are held every year.

Alan Macro, from Theale in Berkshire, survived the crash.

He was not physically injured, but said he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder.

“The railway has become much safer since the accident,” he said.

“Especially because of the train control and warning system that was introduced later.”

“But I thought this was an interim solution and I am disappointed that no further progress has been made in installing a more comprehensive automatic system to stop trains passing red signals.”

An investigation led by Lord Cullen detailed problems with the signals as a result of ineffective management. The Cullen report noted “how so many seemingly good people could achieve so little action” and heard of “a seemingly endemic culture of complacency and inaction.”

Just two weeks before the accident, it was announced that the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) would be rolled out across the network. It was a less expensive safety mechanism that could stop most trains behind a red signal within the overlap distance.

This is still very common. A pair of electronic loops in the track that look like a grid or electric toaster automatically cause a train to brake if it approaches a danger signal too quickly.

“This has been the biggest and most dramatic change,” said Martin Frobisher, Network Rail’s safety and engineering director.

“This interim technology has exceeded all expectations.

“It wasn’t the perfect technology. But introducing the perfect technology would have taken a huge investment and decades of re-signaling everything.”

Between 1900 and 1999, passengers died almost every year in accidents caused by a Signal Passed At Danger (SPAD).

But in the quarter century since Ladbroke Grove there has been no death from SPAD.

This is despite the fact that the number of SPADs remains stubbornly close to 300 each year, with the Salisbury Tunnel disaster in 2021 being the most serious recent example.

The accident led to the creation of three safety organizations with railway responsibility.

This separated the setting of standards, regulations and accident investigations.

“Since then the risk has fallen dramatically,” said Andrew Hall, chief railway accident inspector.

“Some of these advances are due to technology, others are due to a better understanding of risk, and others are due to a structure that better investigates and learns from accidents.”

“There are now fewer problems at level crossings and work in the ‘red zone’ on the tracks has now been more or less eliminated by Network Rail.”

Mark Phillips, chief executive of the Rail Standards and Safety Board, said: “We are developing a future train protection strategy.”

“A better understanding of human factors is a large area of ​​our work, including driver fatigue and maintaining concentration.”

“And we are considering improving TPWS to give drivers real-time information about the speed limit. A modern car displays the speed limit wherever you are. It shouldn’t be difficult or expensive to have this feature on a train.”

Network Rail's Martin Frobisher said: “25 years is a long time.”

He believes it is “important that we do not lose the lessons of Ladbroke Grove”.

“This is about corporate memory and how a new generation of railway engineers needs to be as focused on signals at risk as we are,” he said.

“We have made great progress. But don't be complacent. Don’t forget.”