Iran’s plans for the region disrupted by Haniyeh’s assassination – Analysis – Eurasia Review

After the sudden death of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi, reformist politician Masoud Pezeshkian won the early elections. He replaces the hardliner and could succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Pezeshkian campaigned on a program of change, but not system change. He supports the negotiation of a nuclear agreement with the US and has regularly criticized the Iranian system, but is a supporter of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), declaring: “I still wear the IRGC uniform.”

After the election, Pezeshkian announced his program in “My Message to the New World,” declaring his intention to strengthen relations with Iran's neighbors, specifically mentioning Iraq, Turkey, and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. He stressed the need for a “strong region,” expressed his hope for a “constructive dialogue” with Europe, criticized the United States for withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and called on Washington to “face reality.”

So far, so good. But then Israel killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, the group's negotiator with Israel. Qatar's prime minister responded by saying: “How can mediation be successful if one party murders the other side's negotiator?” Haniyeh's murder in Tehran came just hours after he attended Pezeshkian's swearing-in ceremony. At that ceremony, the new president had promised to continue working for the lifting of Western sanctions against Iran's nuclear program.

Israel's target was not only Haniyeh, who could have been killed in his home in Qatar, but also the threat of a moderate Iranian government that could mobilize support for the Palestinians due to widespread discontent with Israel's war against civilians in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as possible negative rulings against Israel by the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. This only served to increase the influence of Iranian hardliners and allow the Netanyahu government and its American backers to blame the Iranians for the rising tensions in the region.

And in a surprise appointment, Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza, was named head of Hamas' political bureau, succeeding the assassinated Haniyeh as head of the organization. Thus, in a short period of time, Israel managed to stymie an Iranian leader open to dialogue with the West and replace a Hamas official open to dialogue with Israel with its worst enemy. Sinwar's appointment will raise tensions in Jerusalem at a time when both Iran and Israel are trying to restore deterrence but are wary of regional war.

Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, ordered retaliation for Haniyeh’s killing and

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin immediately announced that the US would support Israel in the event of an attack. So it is not necessarily likely that there will be an immediate easing of US-Iranian relations or peace in the region. And Iranian initiatives such as the 2003 “Grand Bargain”, which included the Arab Peace Initiative, will now look like a capitulation.

However, the former Qatari prime minister has suggested that instead of retaliating against Israel, Iran should refrain from retaliating if Israel agrees to an “immediate and permanent ceasefire,” a prisoner exchange and the return of all Palestinians to their homes in Gaza. But for that to happen, the Biden administration must change its stance and force a ceasefire, against the wishes of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies in the US.

President Pezeshkian will have to deal with the immediate crisis and, if it ends without too much damage, focus on joint efforts to build a “strong region” that includes the BRICS countries (Iran joined the organization in January 2024), the Middle East, and South and Central Asia. This time would be well spent rather than procrastinating Iran's negotiations with the US and Europe on the nuclear deal, especially since UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231, which anchored the JCPOA, expires in October 2025. And 2231 also marks the start of “swift” sanctions against the Islamic Republic, although the US will always take unilateral action regardless of a UN Security Council resolution.

A “strong region” policy is a continuation and extension of Iran’s “look east” policy, a turn away from the West and toward Eurasia, which led to long-term cooperation agreements with Russia and China.

In Central Asia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have expanded their trade relations with Iran, and in the case of Tajikistan even signed a defense pact. And the heads of state have all met in person.

After China's (and Iraq's) successful mediation between Tehran and Riyadh led to a de-escalation of tensions, the Iranian president visited Saudi Arabia, embassies were reopened, bilateral trade resumed, and work is underway to resume regular air traffic.

Although the US controls revenues from Iraq's dollar-denominated oil trade and is unhappy with Baghdad buying electricity from Iran, trade between Iraq and Iran has grown, reaching $150 million a month since March 2024. And Baghdad has signaled that it wants all US troops to withdraw by September 2025.

Iran and Pakistan are trying to strengthen their economic relations. Iran has expressed interest in joining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. However, concrete bilateral cooperation is lagging behind potential.

The Balochistan region, which straddles the border between Iran and Pakistan, is a point of contention as both countries conduct counterinsurgency operations there and accuse each other of harboring terrorists.

Planning for the Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline began in 1950. Despite US opposition, the two countries agreed to a 25-year gas purchase agreement (GSPA) in 2010, authorizing the construction of the 2,775-kilometer-long pipeline.

Pakistan has not yet completed its part of the pipeline and faces an $18 billion penalty if it does not complete the work. US hostility to Pakistan's energy needs could ultimately strengthen China's influence if Beijing can find a solution acceptable to Tehran and Islamabad.

Iran and Afghanistan are discussing expanding their trade and economic relations. Recent developments include an agreement to develop the port of Chabahar, a $35 million Afghan investment in Chabahar, a railway linking Khaf (Iran) and Herat in western Afghanistan, and a meeting between the Iranian special envoy to Afghanistan and the acting Afghan foreign minister to discuss bilateral relations.

In April 2022, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation and methamphetamine production, benefiting Iran, which has the highest rate of opium abuse in the world according to the World Health Organization. And according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “more than 3,700 national law enforcement officials have been killed and over 12,000 maimed in counter-narcotics operations over the past three decades.”

Despite the Helmand River Treaty, which Iran and Afghanistan signed in 1973, Iran and Afghanistan are in dispute over Iran's access to the Helmand River. A fair agreement on sharing the water would reduce tensions, build trust and help the economies on both sides of the border.

Many Israeli politicians fear moderates, as Jerusalem's warnings of impending disaster for the Jewish state are key to continued support from Washington. Israeli hardliners successfully combatted moderation by assassinating Swedish diplomat Count Folke Bernadotte and Palestinian leader Abu Jihad, facilitating Hamas funding to weaken the Palestinian Authority, and even killing their own prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, whose death may have been prompted by rhetoric such as then-Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu's claim that Rabin's government was “removed from Jewish tradition.” […] and Jewish values.”

As always, it's all about money.

The main domestic sources of technology in the Middle East are Iran and Israel. Israel must keep Iran isolated, sanctioned and poor to ensure that foreign direct investment is not lured by the promise of a larger market in Iran (around 90 million versus 9 million in Israel). Of course there is Startup Nation, but that is old hat by now, while Iran, despite decades of economic warfare by the US and its allies in the West, has the attraction of a new, untapped market and its proven capabilities in nuclear science, defense and aerospace.

The Palestinians are rightly accused of always hoping for a better deal. The Israeli leadership, on the other hand, is not hoping for a deal. Building a “strong region” and avoiding a devastating war therefore depends on common sense in Tehran and Washington.