US Air Force considers missile defense for distributed bases in fight against China

The US Air Force is making progress in preparing a network of distributed bases and airfields in the Pacific in the event of a war against China, the armed forces' highest-ranking general said on Wednesday. However, more needs to be done to defend the bases against attacks.

“I would feel more secure if we had a more robust active base defense” to protect the smaller operational sites used under a concept called Agile Combat Employment, said Army Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin in a roundtable with reporters at the Pentagon. “If we have to operate from those sites, [sites]Active defence measures against the threat posed by a large number of missile attacks would certainly be helpful.”

The Air Force fears that if a conflict in the Pacific were to occur, China could launch missile barrages at the larger, more traditional U.S. regional air bases in Japan and Guam. Such attacks could seriously impair or completely eliminate the Air Force's ability to launch aircraft in the Pacific.

To counteract this, the Air Force has developed the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) system, which is designed to expand air operations to a variety of smaller operating locations in the region.

Some of these ACE sites could be local civilian airports or simple bases on rough airfields. And they would be operated by smaller teams of “multifunctional pilots” trained to perform multiple tasks – such as refueling aircraft or ensuring safety – rather than just one specialization.

Allvin said the service has succeeded in refining the way ACE operates on the ground and training pilots to conduct such operations.

He pointed to Exercise Bamboo Eagle, which took place earlier this month at multiple locations in the Pacific and at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. During that exercise, expeditionary units trained how to operate in a simulated contested battlespace and practiced entering and exiting smaller bases set up in a “hub-and-spoke” style under ACE.

Bamboo Eagle also provided commanders of participating squadrons – including the 9th Reconnaissance Squadron from Beale Air Force Base, California, and the 23rd Squadron from Moody Air Force Base, Georgia – the opportunity to practice command and control of units dispersed across these numerous field bases without the subordinate group structure the Air Force typically uses, Allvin said.

“It was really fascinating and I think it gave me confidence that we are on the right path,” said Allvin. “We still have a long way to go, but we are training, we are developing facilities and infrastructure to support readiness for larger operations, [and] We are joining forces to take command and control and prepare for this type of operational readiness.”

While expanding the bases would make it harder for China to launch massive missile or other attacks, it would not eliminate such a threat. Allvin said the Air Force is working with the Army on ways to deter these attacks.

“She [the Army] “We are specifically pursuing a number of things to support Agile Combat Employment,” Allvin said.

Allvin declined to provide details on what countermeasures were being planned, but said he wanted capabilities to defend against ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Allvin acknowledged that because of the large number of smaller bases that make up ACE, it is not feasible for each base to have its own missile defense system, so such defense systems must be able to be deployed to where they are most needed at any time, he said.

“If we can't have them everywhere, we want to be able to decide where to use them,” said Allvin. “That means they have to be mobile [and] not repairable.”

He said he was less concerned about the threat posed by small, swarming drones because they may not have the range to cross large parts of the Pacific Ocean and reach their targets.

And proven strategies of confusing the enemy by setting up false targets in the field could still be helpful in defending ACE bases, Allvin said.

“The old methods of camouflage, concealment and deception are still alive and well,” Allvin said. “We just need to adapt them to the 21st century context. … You don't know if this is real or fake. Should I spend one missile on this? Should I spend five missiles on this?”

In developing these deception plans, Allvin said the Air Force must find the right balance between credibility and affordability. The service can make a decoy so credible that it's virtually indistinguishable from a real one, he said, but that can be so expensive that it defeats the purpose of deception.

Passive defenses against cyberattacks and electronic warfare are also an important part of securing ACE bases, Allvin said.

The distribution of operations through Agile Combat Employment also presents some leadership challenges that the service must overcome, Allvin said. In some cases, during a conflict, an aircraft may need to land at a different base than the one from which it took off.

“Knowing where the [alternate base] Maybe better access to the primary parts, the munitions, the fuel – all of these things are possible with a more robust command and control structure,” Allvin said.

An important part of the ACE concept is to teach soldiers to multitask while deployed, Allvin said. The service is adapting its training structures accordingly. New recruits in basic military training are already learning to multitask, he said.

And for pilots already in service, Allvin said, the Air Force is considering integrating multi-occupational training into a professional military education.

Allvin said that in his observations of the Bamboo Eagle, he saw that pilots were already getting used to these new tasks.

“They're just skeptical,” Allvin said of the pilots who work under the ACE concept. “They understand the situation quickly and innovate like no one else. But I want to be able to reduce the risk for them” by improving base defenses.