State Supreme Court addresses liability for Robeson deputy's injuries

The North Carolina Supreme Court has agreed to take a case involving legal liability for the injuries sustained by a Robeson County deputy sheriff while working traffic. The state's appeals court ruled in December that the sheriff's office and a private contractor with the state Department of Transportation were jointly liable for the deputy's 2019 injuries.

The Supreme Court had issued an order in March temporarily blocking the appeals court's decision. A new order on Friday blocked the appeals court's decision indefinitely. A separate order confirmed that the Supreme Court will review the case.

The contractor, Truesdell Corporation, had asked the state's highest court to overturn the appeals court's ruling. “Defendants Truesdell contend that the appeals court departed from the precedent established by our appellate courts for determining whether an employer is a co-employer or whether no employer/employee relationship exists,” the company's lawyers wrote March 4.

“When a 'general employer' leases an employee to a 'special employer,' the special employer will be liable for workers' compensation benefits only if (1) the employee has an express or implied contract of employment with the special employer, (2) the work performed is substantially that of the special employer, and (3) the special employer has the right to direct the details of the work,” the court filing states. “The test expressly includes that the 'work performed is substantially that of the special employer.'”

“The Court of Appeals, however, departed from this test. The Court of Appeals concluded that although Plaintiff was not performing the same type of work as Defendant Truesdell at the time of his injury, that requirement 'is not necessary to establish joint employment under the doctrine of joint employment.' The Court of Appeals modified the test, overturned the Full Commission's proper application of the test, and found Defendant Truesdell liable for half of Plaintiff's medical and compensation costs even though Defendant Truesdell was not Plaintiff's employer,” Truesdell's attorneys wrote.

The appeals court ruling overturned part of an earlier decision by the state Industrial Commission. The commission would have held the sheriff's office solely responsible for paying the deputy's ongoing medical expenses.

Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Appellate Judge Jefferson Griffin noted that the case had the potential to set a precedent.

“Our appellate courts have yet to address the question of whether a police officer who works off-duty as a traffic cop is an independent contractor excluded from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act; or whether he should be considered an employee of the police department for which he is primarily employed, an employee of the private company for which he provides traffic enforcement services, or a joint employee of both,” Griffin wrote.

In March 2019, Deputy Stephen Matthew Lassiter was off duty when a sheriff's captain offered him the opportunity to provide traffic service for a DOT bridge maintenance project along Interstate 95. Lassiter accepted.

While performing this duty under the captain's supervision, “Lassiter was struck by a vehicle and sustained injuries to his head, arms, hands and legs,” Griffin wrote. “Due to the severity of the injuries, plaintiff was flown by helicopter to a hospital in Florence, South Carolina. Plaintiff underwent extensive treatment and two subsequent surgeries.”

When Lassiter filed for disability compensation in April 2019, he listed both the sheriff's office and the contractor, Truesdell Corporation, as his employers at the time of the injury. Both the sheriff and the contractor “denied the existence of an employment relationship,” Griffin wrote.

In November 2022, the Industrial Commission found that Lassiter worked for the sheriff's office, but Truesdell did not.

Griffin and his colleagues on the appeals court rejected the argument that Lassiter worked as an independent contractor.

“Here, we recognize that at the time of his injury, plaintiff was employed as a police officer and was performing traffic services – an official duty of police officers,” Griffin wrote. “In doing so, plaintiff maintained his official status because he was neither acting solely on behalf of a private entity nor conducting his own private business. Moreover, evidence at the hearing indicated that plaintiff was hired because of his official status as a police officer, as provided for by Truesdell's contract with NCDOT, and while he undoubtedly provided a benefit to Truesdell by performing traffic services, plaintiff also served and protected the safety of the community.”

“The plaintiff could not independently use his skills, knowledge or training as a police officer,” Griffin added. “He had to follow the orders of Truesdell and RCSO.” Police supervisors “received orders through Truesdell, who told them how traffic should flow and how many officers were authorized for duty.”

The appellate judges differed from the Industrial Commission regarding Truesdell's responsibility in this case. “The plaintiff here had no express employment contract with Truesdell. However, the evidence demonstrates the existence of an implied contract,” Griffin wrote. “We recognize that Truesdell was not responsible for the plaintiff's training, but Truesdell did hire, pay and supervise the plaintiff.”

Griffin pointed to Truesdell's supervisory role. “Notably, the plaintiff was not originally scheduled to work on the day of his accident,” the appeals court's opinion said. Police supervisors “believed, after consulting the plan provided by Truesdell and the recommended number of officers, that additional officers needed to be on site.”

They “contacted Truesdell to obtain his permission before calling the plaintiff to request his assistance in traffic enforcement. This suggests a consistent level of supervision or control that Truesdell exercised over the officers; if Truesdell had denied the request for an additional officer or refused to present the idea to NCDOT, the plaintiff would not have been on site the night of his injury,” Griffin wrote.

The new decision contained a different interpretation of the joint employment doctrine than the state's appeals court had in an earlier case, Whicker v. Compass Group USA. In that case, the court had rejected a joint employment claim because the two employers performed different types of work.

“We recognize instead that the common employee doctrine expressly states that the service performed by the plaintiff for each employer must be the same or closely related to the service performed for the other employer, not that the nature of the work performed by both employers must be the same or closely related,” Griffin explained. “For if we were to accept the Court's interpretation in Whicker, we would at least effectively prohibit any off-duty police officer performing traffic duty from seeking damages from the company for which he performs traffic duty, regardless of whether an express or implied contract exists, unless the officer performs traffic duty for a private company whose business also performs traffic duty.”

“Here, at the time of his injury, plaintiff was: an individual employee; with an employment contract with both RCSO and Truesdell; under the concurrent control of both RCSO and Truesdell; and he was performing service similar to the service he performed for RCSO when he performed traffic duty for Truesdell,” Griffin concluded. “Therefore, we presume that plaintiff was employed by both RCSO and Truesdell at the time of his injury.”

Judges Hunter Murphy and Toby Hampson agreed with Griffin.