Voepass crash: First report published

A preliminary report on the tragic crash of the aircraft 2Z2283 Signs of ice formation were found on the aircraft, but no clear cause of the accident was identified, the Center for Research and Prevention of Aircraft Accidents (Cenipa) said on Friday.

The document noted that icing detectors had been activated and that cockpit recordings showed the copilot had mentioned “a lot of icing” during the flight. Throughout the flight, the icing warning was activated and deactivated several times, with 10-second alarm durations and 2-minute intervals between activations. The aircraft's pilots made no distress calls or reported adverse weather conditions.

The ATR 72 twin-engine turboprop aircraft, operated by Brazilian airline Voepass, was en route to Guarulhos International Airport in São Paulo with 58 passengers and four crew members on board when it crashed in Vinhedo, 78 kilometers north of the city, on August 7. The following day, authorities recovered the remains of all 34 male and 28 female victims.

Witnesses captured footage showing the plane spinning flat, descending vertically, and crashing into a residential complex, with the fuselage destroyed and engulfed in flames. In the witness videos, the plane's engines can be heard “working.”

At the time of the crash, Metsul, a respected Brazilian weather service company, reported severe icing conditions in São Paulo state. Local media cited experts suggesting icing was a possible cause, but Brazilian aviation expert Lito Sousa cautioned against drawing conclusions based on images alone. “Analyzing a plane crash based on images alone can lead to incorrect conclusions about the causes,” Sousa told the Associated Press. “However, we can observe an aircraft losing lift and lacking horizontal speed. In this state of flat spin, there is no way to regain control of the aircraft.”

Marcelo Moura, Voepass's operations manager, noted that although ice forecasts were in place, they were within acceptable limits for the aircraft. The Brazilian Air Force's Aircraft Accident Investigation and Prevention Center previously stated:

Based on information collected during the initial on-site investigation and recordings from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the Investigation Committee identified and published the sequence of events leading up to the crash.

14:58:05 – the aircraft took off from runway 15 of SBCA with 58 passengers and 04 crew members on board;
15:12:40 – PROPELLER ANTI-ICING 1 and 2 were switched on;
15:14:56 – the electronic ice detector connected to the Centralized Crew Alert System (CCAS) issued a warning signal when passing FL130;
15:15:03 – the aircraft de-icing function has been activated;
15:15:42 – a single signal was heard in the cockpit. The crew then commented that there had been a fault with the aircraft de-icing and that they were correcting this fault.
15:15:49 – the aircraft de-icing system was switched off;
15:16:25 – The electronic ice detector has stopped sending out the warning signal.
15:17:08 – The electronic ice detector has issued an alarm signal.
15:19:13 – the electronic ice detector has stopped giving the warning signal;
15:23:43 – the electronic ice detector sounded an alarm;
15:30:05 – The electronic ice detector has stopped sounding the warning signal.
16:11:02 – the electronic ice detector has issued an alarm signal;
16:12:41 – the electronic ice detector has stopped giving the warning signal;
16:12:55 – the electronic ice detector sounded an alarm;
16:15:16 – The SIC (Second Pilot) contacted the airline’s operational dispatcher at Guarulhos Airport by radio to coordinate the aircraft’s arrival.
16:16:25 – While the SIC was coordinating with the operational dispatcher, a flight attendant called on the intercom. The SIC asked her to wait a moment and continued the conversation with the dispatcher.
16:17:20 – The electronic ice detector was no longer sounding the warning signal. At this point the SIC asked the flight attendant for information to pass on to the operational dispatcher.
16:17:32 – the electronic ice detector sounded an alarm; at this time the PIC informed the passengers about the local conditions at SBGR and the estimated landing time;
16:17:41 – the aircraft de-icing function has been activated;
16:18:41 – at a speed of 191 knots the “cruise speed low” alarm was triggered. At the same time the SIC was in the process of relaying some information to the operational dispatcher.
16:18:47 – The PIC began to brief the approach to SBGR. At the same time APP-SP made a radio call and instructed him to change to frequency 123.25 MHz.
16:18:55 – A single signal was heard in the cockpit. At this time, communication with APP-SP took place.
16:19:07 – the aircraft de-icing system was switched off;
16:19:16 – the crew called APP-SP (São Paulo Approach Control) on frequency 123.25 MHz;
16:19:19 – APP-SP requested aircraft PS-VPB to maintain FL170 due to traffic;
16:19:23 – The crew responded to APP-SP that they were maintaining altitude, were at the ideal descent point and were awaiting clearance.
16:19:28 – At a speed of 184 knots, the REDUCED POWER alarm was activated along with a single beep. The alarm was activated simultaneously with the exchange of messages between APP-SP and the crew.
16:19:30 – APP-SP acknowledged the message and requested the aircraft to wait for clearance;
16:19:31 – The aircraft Passaredo 2283 reported receipt of the message and thanked air traffic control;
16:19:33 – the PIC resumed the approach briefing;
16:20:00 – the Deputy Commander (SIC) commented: “Lots of icing”;
16:20:05 – the AIRFRAME DE-ICING function was activated for the third time;
16:20:33 – APP-SP cleared the aircraft to proceed directly to the SANPA position maintaining FL170 and advised that descent would be cleared in two minutes.
16:20:39 – the crew acknowledged receipt of the flight instruction (last communication from the flight crew);
16:20:50 – The aircraft began a right turn to head for the SANPA position.
16:20:57 – during the turn, at a speed of 169 knots, the “increase speed” alarm was activated, along with a single beep. Immediately afterwards, a vibration sound was heard in the aircraft, simultaneously with the activation of the stall alarm;
16:21:09 – Control of the aircraft was lost and it entered an abnormal attitude until it collided with the ground. The aircraft rolled to the left to a bank angle of 52 degrees and then to the right to a bank angle of 94 degrees, executing a 180-degree clockwise turn. The turn was then reversed to a counterclockwise direction, with the aircraft completing five full turns in a shallow spin before crashing into the ground.

Throughout the flight, the ice warning was activated and deactivated several times, with an alarm duration of 10 seconds and then 2-minute intervals between activations.