Ukrainian frontline units fight against the Russians and more

Mortar crews on the Ukrainian front are exhausted, under-equipped and under constant threat of Russian attacks, but they continue to fight.

“We mainly fire at the attacking Russian infantry when they carry out an attack,” says Anatoliy, commander of a mortar battery of the 92nd Infantry Regiment.^and Separate Assault Brigade. His voice reflects the exhaustion of a unit fighting against increasingly weaker opponents.

“Sometimes we get 50 or 70 mortar shells twice a week, but in the last few weeks it has only been 20 to 30,” he says. “We are forced to make the best of what we have.”

Using both 82mm and 120mm projectiles, the mortar team faces a constant balancing act in their daily operations. Supplies come from different sources, so they must adapt to ammunition that behaves differently (for example, manufacturers use different quantities and qualities of propellant).

“We often have a selection of different varieties, every day we learn something new,” says Anatoliy. “American, Pakistani, Spanish, Italian, Romanian, Ukrainian – you name it, we've used it. With each new batch we shoot and take notes on how they shoot.”

This inconsistency causes logistical problems. “The best mortars we fired were Soviet ones, they are the most stable. The newer shells are less predictable and it takes time to get used to them,” says Anatoliy. “It would be much easier if we had a standard type, like the Soviet shells. But with the variety we have, we have to constantly make corrections.”

To overcome these challenges, Ukrainian mortar units are sharing best practices through a channel in a messenger app, he says.

The weather is another complicating factor. Wind, rain and fog often force the team to adjust their range. “Every hour we have to make changes based on weather conditions. Sometimes the mortars don't land anywhere near where they should,” says Oleksandr, whose call sign is “Hunter.”

In dense fog, the team relies on radio contact with the infantry on the ground to correct their aim. “If we can't see anything, the infantry radios in to tell us where the bullets are landing and helps us adjust our fire,” he explains.

The enemy threat is always there, and Russian drones are also hunting Ukrainian positions. “Their drones are always above us and are dropping mines that our guys sometimes step on,” says Oleksandr. The unit's position makes it vulnerable and casualties are frequent.

“A week ago, five of our men from another unit were on their way to a forward position in a Humvee when they were killed by Russian drones,” he says. On one occasion, the Russians dropped six glide bombs on their area in just 15 minutes, he says.

“We watch the drone feeds to see what we hit,” says Anatoliy. “The enemy is always trying to take out our drone pilots to blind us and disrupt our operations.”

Because of the drone threat, the Russians rarely bring heavy tanks to the front. “We mainly shoot at infantry because the heavy tanks no longer come to the front,” explains Oleksandr. “They move on motorcycles and off-road vehicles. [all-terrain vehicles] now. I can't remember the last time I saw an enemy tank.”

Another danger to the unit is the need to reconnoiter new positions. This task is undertaken by senior officers and recent missions have been fatal. One officer was killed during reconnaissance and another commander was seriously injured after stepping on a mine.

In addition to external threats, the unit also struggles with internal bureaucracy – a relic of Soviet military tradition. After long hours at the front, Anatoliy complains that when he returns to base, he often spends even more time filling out endless paperwork. The soldiers are frustrated because more of it has not been digitized.

“This is an old Soviet method,” says Oleksandr. “Before, our commander had to submit daily reports on what everyone was doing and where they were in the morning and evening. They even made checklists for our checklists.”

Much of the bureaucracy was abolished at the beginning of the war because of the urgent need to focus on fighting the invading Russians. However, when the front began to stabilize, the top Ukrainian leadership returned to the old Soviet-style methods, he said.

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. You can find him on X/Twitter at @DVKirichenko.

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