Iran's regional strategy is at stake after Nasrallah's assassination

Questions have been raised about Iran's strategy in the region as Israel stepped up its attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon after it killed party leader Hassan Nasrallah, one of Tehan's key allies in its resistance axis.

Nasrallah was killed on Friday in an Israeli raid on Beirut's southern suburbs. A deputy commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan, was also killed in the attack.

Nasrallah's death was another major blow to Iran's regional strategy. The biggest blow came in January 2020, when the US killed IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport. Soleimani was the mastermind of Iran's foreign operations.

The country had never really recovered from his death, either regionally or internally, even as it tried to paint a different picture under the administration of the late President Ebrahim Raisi and especially after Hamas' Al-Aqsa flood operation in Gaza .

Raisi's Iran sought to demonstrate that it was pursuing a coherent regional policy, whether in terms of supporting the activities of the Axis of Resistance or improving relations with its neighbors.

Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president after Raisi died in a helicopter crash in May. He appeared to take a different approach than his predecessor, showing openness to working with the West. This approach was confirmed as he assembled his foreign policy team, which included members of the delegation that secured the 2015 nuclear deal with the West that led to the lifting of sanctions against Iran.

Going forward, Pezeshkian will face major challenges in lifting further sanctions against his country or easing tensions with European powers, especially if Donald Trump is elected president of the United States in November.

Trump could restore maximum pressure on Tehran if the country rejects his conditions for reaching a new nuclear deal that would include changes to its behavior in the region and curbs on its ballistic missile and drone programs.

In any case, the Iranian nuclear issue will be a top priority in any talks between Iran and the West, regardless of who wins the American elections on November 5th.

Other challenges last year included the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July, hours after he attended Pezeshkian's swearing-in ceremony.

The assassination cast a shadow over the new president's term in office amid fears that the IRGC would retaliate for the killing. Ultimately, the Guard made no major response, leaving Tehran supporters somewhat disappointed.

Pezeshkian said in New York last week that the retaliation had affected ceasefire negotiations in Gaza and that Iran had come under pressure to show restraint. In Iran he was criticized for Tehran's desire to reduce tensions in the region, including with Israel.

The Iranian government fears that a new confrontation between Iran and Israel would hurt Trump's chances of winning the election, something Tehran wants to avoid. Trump approved the killing of Soleimani, withdrew the USA from the nuclear agreement and thus imposed new sanctions on Tehran.

In light of Nasrallah's assassination last week, what will the IRGC do to avenge the assassination of one of Iran's key allies? Iranian government officials warned Pezeshkian not to fall into Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's “trap” and drag his country into war.

The IRGC wields significant economic, political and cultural influence in Iran and relies on its proxy war in the region without having to engage Iran in direct confrontation with its enemies.

So the most likely option is for Iran to mobilize its proxies on multiple fronts to take revenge on Israel for the latest blow inflicted on it.

The second option is for the IRGC to fire hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones against Israel just to save face.

The decision to avenge the killings of Nasrallah and Nilforoushan will be taken at the highest level, said Mohammad Javad Zarif, vice president for strategic affairs, referring to the Supreme National Security Council, whose decisions are approved by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Failure to retaliate against the killings will raise doubts among IRGC supporters about its ability to act in times of crisis.

The third option could be for the IRGC to carry out a large-scale missile attack on Israeli facilities and infrastructure. This is unlikely as the US elections are approaching and such an attack could lead to an American attack on Iran and possibly its nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the Iranian people are strongly opposed to the idea of ​​Iran being drawn into a destructive war.

The fourth option would be for Iran to engage in a limited confrontation with Israel to justify why the country needs strategic deterrent weapons such as ballistic missiles. Such a move would effectively allow Iran to alter its nuclear program and lead it to produce nuclear weapons.